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Is the Constitution "Godless" or Just
Nondenominational?
The Godless Constitution. By Isaac Kramnick" & R. Laurence Moore." New
York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996. Pp. 191. $22.00.
In an infamous address at the 1992 Republican National Convention in
Houston, Pat Buchanan declared that "'[t]here is a religious war going on ...
for the soul of America."" Maintaining that the United States is "'a nation
that we still call God's,"' he exhorted supporters to ."take back our
culture, and take back our country.' 2 Buchanan's speech, with its clarion call
for a religious restoration, tacitly cast American history in terms of a story of
the fall: The nation's origins, his rhetoric implied, lay in an Edenic Christianity
from which God-fearing Americans have been rudely expelled due to the sins
of secular infidels who would deny the nation's fundamentally Christian
identity. Buchanan's words garnered immense publicity because they were
nationally televised during prime time; 3 the "fall" story underlying his address,
however, is one commonly told by the Religious Right.4
In The Godless Constitution, Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore set
out to explode the legitimacy of what they call "religious correctness"-the
claim that "the United States was established as a Christian nation by Christian
people, with the Christian religion assigned a central place in guiding the
nation's destiny" (p. 13). To correct the purveyors of religious correctness, the
authors pursue a twofold thesis. First, they argue that as a matter of history,
* Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government, Comcll University.
** Professor of History, Cornell University.
1. Judi Hasson, Religion Shares Convention Stage, USA TODAY. Aug. 18. 1992. at 4A.
2. Buchanan Speech Highlights, GANNETT NEws SERV., Aug. 17. 1992, available in LEXIS. News
Library, Arcnws File.
3. See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come 'Home'. BOSTON GLOBE. Aug. 18.
1992, at 12.
4. See, e.g., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF PAT ROBERTSO 5I. 66 (1994) (arguing that "'[the Amriccan
Revolution produced a constitution and a government based on biblical pnnciples of Christianity- but that
present day secularists "have tried to throw out the last remnants of Christianity in America").
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the nation's Founders (as well as their philosophical progenitors in England
and their immediate political descendants in America) believed that
government should be a secular enterprise uninfluenced by, and indifferent to,
religious concerns; this belief, according to the authors, is inscribed in the
Constitution. Second, they posit that as a normative matter, the Founders' faith
in a secular state should be heeded by the modem American polity, and that
failure to ward off religious influences on American politics (particularly those
of the Religious Right) will simultaneously betray constitutional values and
exacerbate the nation's moral decline.
Kramnick and Moore deserve plaudits for seriously engaging the historical
and constitutional rhetoric of the Religious Right and systematically
demolishing its intellectual credibility. No one can finish their book and still
make a reasonable case that the Constitution was conceived as a blueprint for
a uniformly "Christian nation" (p. 13). The authors also deliver a valuable
remonstrance against those who peddle intolerance while wrapped in the
mantles of the Bible and the Constitution. Unfortunately, however, Kramnick
and Moore's advocacy of "godless Constitution[alism]" (p. 12) occasionally
veers beyond rebuttal of the Christian nation theory and toward a defense of
an affirmatively secular state that largely excludes religion from the public
sphere. At such junctures, the authors render their historical and prescriptive
arguments vulnerable to some of the very criticisms they level at the acolytes
of "religious correctness" (p. 13).
Kramnick and Moore present their historical evidence through a series of
vignettes.5 They begin, for instance, with a lively chapter on the Constitution's
framing and ratification, in which they argue that the text's drafters
deliberately designed it to be "an instrument with which to structure the secular
politics of individual interest and happiness" (p. 27). As proof, they point to
the absence of any express mention of "God" or "Christianity" in the
Constitution itself and to the inclusion of the No Religious Test Clause in
Article VI. 6 Concluding that "[t]he advocates of a secular state won" at the
Founding (p. 28), Kramnick and Moore proceed to examine two other key
historical episodes: the Sunday Mail Controversy of 1820 to 1830 (pp. 132-43)
and the "Christian amendment" movement of the post-Civil War era (pp.
5. The scope of Kramnick and Moore's historical inquiry should be singled out for credit. Unlike many
constitutional scholars, the authors do not rest their historical case solely on excavation of "original intent."
Cf. PHILIP BOBErrr, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE 9 (1982) (defining historical argument, as modality of
constitutional interpretation, in terms of search for "the original understanding of the constitutional
provision to be construed").
6. "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI. Other scholars, however, have argued that Founding-era citizens
understood the Clause not as a statement of the Constitution's secularism but as a guardian of religious
pluralism. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. Rns. L. REv. 674 (1987).
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144-48).7 In both instances, religious zealots sought to transform the nation
into "a Christian commonwealth where the state and spiritual ideals
commingled" (p. 132). The failure of both crusades, the authors contend,
demonstrates that the secular victory of the Founding has been an enduring
one.
Kramnick and Moore take particular care to identify a distinguished
American tradition of religious opposition to theocracy. Though the authors
mention many adherents of that tradition in the course of their book, they
focus on two: Roger Williams and the American Baptists. Both Williams
(banished from Massachusetts Bay in 1636 for nonconformism) and the
American Baptists (oppressed by New England's Puritan establishment
throughout the pre-Independence era) suffered intense persecution at the hands
of the 2tate. Both, in turn, came to view the juxtaposition of religious and
political spheres with great suspicion. For Kramnick and Moore, these
examples refute any "notion that the idea of the godless Constitution is the
invention of militant secularists" (p. 111). The authors do not, however,
neglect the historical importance of secular resistance to theocracy. In analytic
expositions of English Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke, Joseph
Priestley, and James Burgh, Kramnick and Moore trace the liberal, laissez-faire
pedigree of the "godless Constitution" and its survival in the thought of
Jefferson, Madison, and their contemporaries (pp. 67-109).
In the final chapter of the book, titled "Religious Politics and America's
Moral Dilemmas," the authors' argument becomes more explicitly normative.
Kramnick and Moore emphasize the Founders' conviction that "democratic
government was not created to produce moral citizens. It was the other way
around: moral citizens constructed and preserved democracy" (p. 151). The
authors decry the imperilment of this ideal, excoriating Pat Robertson, Ralph
Reed, and Pat Buchanan for cloaking themselves in the rhetoric of religion and
morality while promoting a virulent and obdurate symbolic politics that
threatens the nation's democratic tradition (pp. 153--64).
The first problem with The Godless Constitution-and the genesis of
several others-lies in the authors' failure to define exactly what they mean
by the title phrase, and especially by the term "godless." What exactly does
"godless Constitutionalism" connote? Kramnick and Moore's account differs
at different junctures. At some points, the authors' claims are virtually
incontrovertible, as when they argue that the Constitution bars establishment
of a theocratic (e.g., "Christian") state at the federal level (p. 143) and formal
religious tests for public office (p. 168). At others, their contentions are more
dubious: The authors also suggest, for instance, that the Constitution proscribes
local establishments just as clearly as federal ones (p. 104); prohibits
7. For further exposition of these controversies. see MORTON BORDEN. JEWS. TURKS. AND INFIDELS
58-74, 103-07 (1984).
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governmental support for religious institutions in any way that privileges their
work over that of secular entities (p. 152); rules out religion-based advocacy
of legislation (p. 130); and frowns on statements by elected officials that they
are following or fulfilling divine imperatives in making public policy (p. 130).
These latter claims, which intermingle with Kramnick and Moore's more
modest contentions as the book unfolds, confuse readers seeking to assess the
authors' overall argument; worse still, they present an unbalanced (and at times
unreliable) account of the historical record.
Take, for example, the authors' contention that the Establishment Clause
was drafted to preclude both federal and state or local establishments of
religion (p. 104). Kramnick and Moore posit that though "[t]he Christian right
offers a narrow reading in which the ... clause refers only to the prohibition
of a national church .... [w]hat is perfectly clear, despite today's debate, is
that Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights, shared [the] broader reading" (p.
104). Madison's agreement with the authors' expansive reading, however, is
far from "perfectly clear." 8 And the "narrow reading" of the Establishment
Clause can hardly be described as a product of the Christian right: A long line
of constitutional scholarship has recognized that the Clause was widely
understood to allow state establishments until radically reinterpreted by the
Everson Court in 1947.9
The authors likewise tread on unfirm ground when they assert historical
support for the proposition that government has "an obligation not to
encourage [religion] ... in a way that privilege[s] it over the work of
nongovernmental secular agencies" (p. 152). This claim is troubling even if
one ignores its insensitivity to principles of federalism (e.g., even if one
overlooks that as of 1789, no fewer than six states featured government-
supported churches, and all thirteen promoted religion in some manner). 0 If
8. The Madison of Federalist No. 10, for instance, cites religious pluralism as the best defense against
the threat of sectarian conflagration, a position wholly consistent with state and local establishments. See
THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Additionally, while
participating in the congressional debate over the Bill of Rights in 1789, Madison sponsored an amendment
that would have limited state governments' power to curtail their citizens' freedom of speech, press, and
conscience, but would have permitted state establishment of religion-an amendment Madison proudly
spoke of as "the most valuable... in the whole list" he presented to Congress. I ANNALS OF CONo. 784
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Aug. 17, 1789); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1159 (1991) (discussing Madison's proposed amendment and its implications for
modem interpretation of Establishment Clause). Madison, of course, also penned the Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which the modem Supreme Court has east as the
paradigmatic expression of strict separation in the era of the Founding. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12, 63 app. (1947). For a cogent summary of Madison's vacillations over the course
of his career, see GERALD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERIcA 86-87 (1987).
9. See, e.g., EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RiGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 104 & n.5
(reprint 1979) (1959); Amar, supra note 8, at 1157-58; Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Historical Meaning and
Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J.
65, 84-85, 127-30 (1962); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment,
1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 371-73; see also Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
10. See BRADLEY, supra note 8, at 13.
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the Founding generation understood the First Amendment to bar federal
promotion of religion, for instance, why did the first Congress pass a statutory
extension of the Northwest Ordinance that encouraged formation of religious
schools by emphasizing the necessity of "religion, morality, and
knowledge... to good government and the happiness of mankind"?"
Moreover, why did the Senate ratify a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians in
1803 that appropriated $100 annually for priestly ministrations and $300 for
the erection of a church? 2 These examples-and the myriad other instances
of federal aid to religious entities in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth
centuries-do not, of course, dictate how present generations should interpret
the Constitution's Religion Clauses. But they do debunk assertions that history
has bequeathed us a strongly and unequivocally "godless" Constitution.
Consider finally the authors' claims that religion-based advocacy of
legislation and appeals to the divine in making public policy "offend ... the
religious rules of this country set up to protect the free exercise of religion"
(p. 130). Here too Kramnick and Moore's arguments are not supported by the
historical record. Surely the authors would not maintain that the passage of the
Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments violated constitutional principles of
free exercise-yet supporters of both actively invoked religious principles in
fighting for ratification.' 3 Surely the authors would not argue that Presidents
Washington, Madison, and Lincoln trenched on First Amendment values-yet
each of these constitutional giants publicly appealed to personal and collective
religious faith at critical junctures in his presidency. 4
The deeper problem with Kramnick and Moore's book, however, lies
neither in its shifting claims regarding the nature of the Constitution's
"godlessness," nor in the historical inaccuracies of the authors' more strident
contentions. It lies rather in Kramnick and Moore's attitude toward religion
and religious adherents. In The Culture of Disbelief, Stephen Carter decries
those who "trivializ[e]" religion by unthinkingly denying respect to people who
"take ... religion seriously."' 5 Though the authors profess sympathy with
Carter's position (pp. 14, 175), their treatment of religion often lapses into a
11. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Oluo, ch. 8. I Star.
50, 52 n.(a) (1789) (adapting original Northwest Ordinance to newly ratified Constitution).
12. See A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians. Dec. 23,
1803, art. 1II, 7 Stat. 78, 79.
13. See, e.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMNT 1890-1920.
at 64-75 (1965) (examining complex but critical role of religion in women's suffrage movement); William
E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513. 525-26 (1974) (detailing key role of religion in American
antislavery movement).
14. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4. 1861). reprinted in I GREAT ISSUES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 389, 396 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958); James Madison. Thanksgiving
Proclamation of July 9, 1812, reprinted in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDEL'S 513 (James D.
Richardson ed., n.p., U.S. Cong. 1898); George Washington. First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30. 1789). in
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 27 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
15. STEPHEN L. CARTER. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 15 (1993).
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textbook illustration of the phenomenon he describes. Kramnick and Moore see
only two sides in the debate over the role of religion in American politics: the
"party of the godless Constitution" (advocating religion's relegation to the
private sphere) and "the party of religious correctness" (seeking formal
establishment of a Christian state) (pp. 12-13). Other positions-held by
moderate, rational, religious citizens who believe that American politics should
be neither hermetically secular nor fanatically theocratic-are never
contemplated. The authors' affinity for such facile dichotomies not only
produces an oversimplified, monochromatic view of the religion debate; it also,
at times, leads them to trivialize the convictions of religious adherents.
Kramnick and Moore blithely characterize all proponents of prayer in schools,
for instance, as purveyors of "symbolic politics" who seek to install "vapid
prayers as a way of saying 'in your face' to some evil group of secular
humanists" (p. 165)-never considering that some might seek to pray in
schools out of actual devotion, or that others might promote school prayer as
a modest way to ameliorate problems of nihilism, materialism, and violence
among American youth.
In the end, the authors' polarizing impulses also prevent them from
addressing the fascinating questions at the center of America's struggle with
the role of religion in politics. The modem Supreme Court has recognized that
the Constitution bars theocratic government;' 6 it has also recognized,
however, that the Constitution bars efforts to excommunicate religious
adherents and institutions from the public sphere.17 The interesting problems
lie between these poles, in cases such as Lee v. Weisman'8 and Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,9 which challenge us to
determine neither whether the Constitution is "godless," nor whether it
sanctions a "Christian nation," but rather what constitutes religious freedom
and what religious coercion.2"
-Erez Kalir
16. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (declaring that "[n]either a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church").
17. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978) (holding that state may not limit political
participation to those who eschew religious practice).
18. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that nondenominational benediction ceremony at public school
violates Establishment Clause).
19. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (holding that denial of university funds to religious student magazine
violates First Amendment principles and expressly rejecting applicability of Establishment Clause
strictures).
20. Important exemplars of the animated scholarly debate about the Constitution's Religion Clauses
include JEssE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1995), Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992), Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NoTRE DAMn L.
REV. 311 (1986), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195
(1992).
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"From Opportunity to Entitlement"
and Back Again-Or Beyond
From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great
Society Liberalism. By Gareth Davies.* Lawrence: Universit " Press of Kansas,
1996. Pp. xii, 320. $35.00.
Is liberalism in America poised to regain a workable popular consensus?
Recent political commentary suggests that it is,' and Democrats have been
struggling within their ranks to define and control the identity of this revived
liberalism. 2 In From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and
Decline of Great Society Liberalism, Gareth Davies enters the fray with a
historical account of why the New Deal liberal consensus was once lost.
Davies's thesis is that in the period 1964-1972, liberal leaders came to
embrace an "entitlement" ideology that repudiated the values of work and self-
sufficiency central to Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society "opportunity"
liberalism (pp. 2-3, 12). The book gives a balanced history of the ideological
underpinnings of opportunity liberalism and its politically damaging
transformation, and offers insight on which strands of liberalism bear reviving.
I
Davies argues that America's dominant social philosophy is individualism,
defined "within the specific context of national attitudes toward dependency
and work" and associated with "a persistent tendency to denigrate dependency
and elevate self-help" (p. 8). He traces the individualist ethic in the rhetoric of
opportunity liberalism through successive liberal movements, seeking to
establish it as a "traditional and authentically liberal" position (pp. 2-3). By
his account, Progressive-era reformers built a liberal political consensus by
rejecting laissez-faire conservative doctrines while insisting on individual self-
* Lecturer in American Politics and History, University of Lancaster.
1. See, e.g., E.J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD: WHY PROGRESSIVES WILL DOMI.SATE TIIE
NEXT POLMCAL ERA (1996); GORDON MACINNES, WRONG FOR ALL TIE RIGHT REASONS How WIIrTE
LIBERALS HAVE BEEN UNDONE BY RACE (1996); JACOB WEISBERG. IN DEFENSE OF GovMR.t'E.%r THfE
FALL AND RISE OF PUBLIC TRUST (1996).
2. The "New Democrats" associated with the Democratic Leadership Council argue that the
Democratic Party's "extreme" left wing is out of touch with middle-class values. For a good ovcrview of
the New Democrat debate, see Jeff Faux, The Myth of the New Democrat. Am. PROSPECT. Fall 1993. at
20, and Will Marshall, Friend or Faux?, AM. PROSPECt. Winter 1994. at 10.
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help.3 New Deal liberalism continued this tradition of government activism
that nevertheless disparaged dependency, creating social insurance and public
works programs that linked income to employment. Great Society liberalism
also upheld the ideal of individual self-sufficiency, adding rehabilitative job
assistance services and work conditions for welfare recipients.
The "one major exception to this tradition of opportunity-centered
liberalism," however, arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It consisted of
"radical notions of income by right ... [with which] American liberalism
remains associated in the public mind" (p. 3). The "entitlement" liberals
successfully attacked work requirements and other conditions placed on welfare
recipients. They favored reforms to guarantee an unconditional minimum
income. But the entitlement approach, in Davies's opinion, was doomed to
"inevitable defeat" (p. 233). Moreover, it led liberals to the politically
disastrous "denunciation of societal values... [and the] abandonment of the
search for consensus" (p. 184). Davies's pointed implication is that liberals can
recapture a national consensus only by reclaiming individualism and work-
oriented ideals as their own.
Reclaiming opportunity ideology does not necessarily force liberals down
a single path, however. The book reveals that a variety of strategies, including
a full employment policy, public works projects, social insurance programs,
and rehabilitative job training and placement efforts, are consistent with liberal
work and self-sufficiency ideals. All these strategies reject laissez-faire in favor
of government action to create income security, but each ties income security
to work requirements in a significantly different way.
The possibility of alternative ways of linking work and self-sufficiency
raises two challenges to Davies's thesis. First, are middle-class Americans
really estranged from entitlement ideology, as Davies claims, or do they just
object to treating income support as an "entitlement" for the poor? Middle
America seems to favor an entitlement-like "no strings attached" approach in
government programs for its own benefit. Second, is Davies right to locate the
welfare policies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and today's
New Democrats under the single banner of opportunity liberalism? The
distinctiveness of a rehabilitative approach to welfare policy might best be seen
by its inability to fit into either the old contractual analogy of New Deal social
insurance and public works programs, or the 1960s New Property analogy of
entitlement to an unconditional minimum income. The new approach suggests
instead a new private law analogy, beyond both contract and property.
3. Davies argues that "[t]he distinctive quality of progressive individualism was the claim that laissez-
faire capitalism impeded self-advancement. The dependent poor were victims of unregulated
combination .. ." (p. 12). See RICHARD HOFSTrADTE, THE AGE OF REFoRM 143 (1955) (describing





Charles Reich's influential 1964 article on the "New Property"'
highlighted the connection between the emergent entitlement ideology and the
liberal concern with individual autonomy. Reich denounced the way the
government used Americans' common and increasing dependence on valuable
interests created and controlled by the state to intrude into individuals' private
lives.5 He argued that government benefits should be deemed "property rights"
rather than privileges, because property would "perform[] the function of
maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones
within which the majority has to yield to the owner."
6
Entitlement liberals similarly sought to remove seemingly improper
governmental constraints on the private lives of welfare recipients. Loosening
the ties between income and work-ties that had been demanded by the
opportunity ethic-was the price of securing a "zone" of autonomy for
everyone. Moreover, the "autonomy" foundation of entitlement liberalism,
rooted in the protection of individual liberty against state control, had liberal
credentials strong enough to match even the opportunity ideology.
Reich's New Property concept had the potential to unify Americans from
different economic classes behind this alternative liberal commitment to
autonomy. However, an apparent class bias has prevented this unification of
interests. Americans have never subjected Social Security and unemployment
insurance beneficiaries to moral and behavioral conditions as intrusive as those
placed on welfare recipients, such as the "no man in the house" rule,7
mandatory cooperation in the state's paternity suits,' or sanctions when
children are truant from school. 9 This disparate treatment cannot be explained
away by claiming that people in poverty need special guidance from the
government, or that redistributive programs in themselves justify government
controls over the recipients' use of the benefits. For not only are government
benefit programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance
redistributive, they are also precisely what keep many "middle class" recipients
from becoming poor.'0
4. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733 (1964).
5. See id. at 746-51, 756-64.
6. Id. at 771.
7. See id at 761-62 (describing intrusiveness of this rule); see also King v. Smith. 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (striking down this rule).
8. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L No. 104-
193, § 408(a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2135 (reducing or eliminating government assistance for noncooperation
in establishing paternity).
9. See id. § 404(i) (providing sanctions for welfare recipients who fall to ensure that their minor
children attend school).
10. See, e.g., William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARv. J. O,' LtS.
462, 466 (1996) (documenting that "[w]ithout Social Security. most seniors would fall below the poverty
level today"). On the contribution of unemployment benefits to keeping unemployed workers' families
1996]
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The real difference is that, unlike these other government benefits, welfare
benefits cannot be understood contractually as "earned" from prior
"contributions."" Welfare benefits do not fit into the contractual model
because they are not tied to any previous effort or responsibility and cannot be
conceptualized as the fruits of a prior, fixed agreement with the government.'2
Social insurance, by contrast, embodies contractual principles of prospectivity
(the agreement is fixed in advance) and neutrality (the benefits received are
those bargained for and are not related to the recipient's individual, contextual
need).'
3
The contract model's symbolic division between welfare benefits and other
government benefits enables middle America to justify government control
over the lives of welfare recipients. Yet rejection of entitlement liberalism here
coexists with endorsement of one of its core values-autonomy-in income
support programs for the middle class. Aspects of entitlement ideology retain
a place in American social philosophy with which Davies has not reckoned.
III
If opportunity ideology continues to dominate our national philosophy with
respect to poverty policy, then the welfare reform legislation of 1996 might
hold the seeds of the revived liberal consensus that Davies's book anticipates.
Federalism and devolution issues to one side, the new law most notably
transforms welfare into a temporary assistance program 4 focused on
providing services to help recipients into employment.' 5 Thus, it links income
support once again to work and disavows the unconditional right of poor
families to government support.' 6 The opportunity-to-entitlement shift that
Davies describes appears to have come full circle, bringing welfare back into
the fold of the New Deal liberal consensus that fell apart in the late 1960s.
above the poverty line, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO/HRD-93-107, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: PROGRAM'S ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED 42 (1993).
I I. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 143 1,
1438 (1986); see also ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK 363 (1974) (providing example of how even make-work projects in New Deal enabled participants
to feel that they were earning their benefits).
12. Welfare benefits can be seen as directly analogous to public works programs, with "rearing
children" seen as work that has an important public component. On this view, it is the devaluation of child
rearing that leads to the breakdown in the contractual analogy. See Simon, supra note II, at 1483.
13. See id. at 1442.
14. See § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii), 110 Stat. at 2113 (requiring recipient to engage in work once determined
to be work-ready or after she has received assistance for 24 months, whichever is earlier); id. § 408(a)(7)
(barring assistance beyond five calendar years from date of first receiving benefits).
15. See id. § 402(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring states to "[c]onduct a program ... [that] provides parents with
job preparation, work, and support services to enable them to leave the program and become self-
sufficient").
16. See id. § 401(b) ("This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance
under any State program funded under this part.").
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Although the 1996 welfare reforms decidedly represent a movement away
from entitlement liberalism and the property analogy for public benefits, they
do not really recapture the original philosophy of the New Deal social
insurance programs or the contract analogy. Even now, welfare does not fit
comfortably into the contractual model. The poverty of a family with children
is still the criterion for receiving welfare benefits. No prior contribution is
required, nor are the income transfers or job training services regarded as
earned even if welfare recipients find work afterward. Moreover, the new focus
on recipients' individual needs to become employable17 flies in the face of
contractual neutrality.
If not property and not contract, is there a better private law analogy for
our new welfare policy? Perhaps we should consider an analogy to tort. At the
core of tort theory is the understanding that there are some contingencies for
which the parties involved could not efficiently bargain ex ante, before the
harm occurs.' 8 Most welfare recipients are poor precisely because they have
not formed sufficient attachments to the work force ex ante to be covered
under one of the "contractual" social insurance programs.' 9 The welfare
program's focus on need is the analog of tort's focus on harm. Whereas
contract protects the expected benefit of the bargain, and property protects the
ability to control what one has and to exclude others from using it, tort is
oriented toward repairing harm itself.20 Tort's compensation notion parallels
the rehabilitation orientation of contemporary welfare policy: The welfare
recipient is "whole" when she becomes an "employable" member of society.
Thus tort, like welfare, rejects contractual principles of prospectivity and
neutrality, and instead adopts a highly individualistic and reactive approach.
17. See id. § 408(b) (describing "Individual Responsibility Plans" setting forth personal rehabilitative
and employment goals).
18. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INITRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNo.mtlcs 37 (1983) (using classic
tort example of automobile accidents involving pedestrians to illustrate point that "bargaining obviously
cannot lead to the efficient outcome since neither drivers nor pedestrians know in advance with whom to
bargain").
19. See Stephen Bingham, Replace Welfare for Contingent Workers with Unemployment Compensaton.
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937, 943 (1995); Deborah MaranvilIc. Changing Economy Changing Lives.
Unemployment Insurance and the Contingent Woriforce. 4 B.U. PUB. lNT. Li. 291. 331-32 (1995).
Unemployment insurance protects less than half of the workforce: "The excluded workers include those
in the less skilled marginal occupations; those seeking their first job; or those reentenng the labor force.
All states require a certain period of work prior to eligibility in order to eliminate the casual or intermittent
worker." Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L & SOC. CHANGE 457. 484-85 (1987-88).
20. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. PROSSER AND KEEo ON THE LAw OF TORTs § I. at 6 (5th ed.
1984) ("There remains a body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather than
the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized interests ....
This is the law of torts."); Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO P~tLOSOPHY OF LAw AND
LEGAL THEORY 57, 57 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) ("Damages is a backward.looking remedy that ts
intended to compensate the plaintiff for the harm suffered."). Of course, the duty to mitigate damages.
which imposes responsibilities on the injured party analogous to the obligation imposed on welfare
recipients to seek employment, is common to both tort and contract theory.
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Two other elements of tort, causation and liability,2' might have a welfare
analog within the liberal understanding of why government action to alleviate
poverty is justified-indeed compelled-in the first place. Progressive and
New Deal liberals originally rejected laissez-faire in favor of active
government out of some belief in society's collective obligation to attend to the
distributive effects of its economic structures.' Just as welfare alleviates the
poverty inevitable in a free market economy, tort alleviates the unavoidable
individual harms arising from the activities of modem society.' On a tort
model of welfare, therefore, society can be conceptualized as a strictly liable
tortfeasor with an obligation to compensate those who are made poor by its
economic structures. Likewise, welfare recipients are contributorily negligent
and hence cut off from further assistance if, having (in theory) received
education and job training, they fall to find and keep paying jobs.
A tort analogy might reconcile the American individualist tradition with
need-based redistribution to a greater extent than either the contract or property
model allows. Ultimately, we need a new analogy for our new welfare policy
because its rehabilitative welfare-to-work approach diverges from the values
underlying the social insurance and public works programs that forged the true
legacy of New Deal liberalism. By lumping both social insurance and
rehabilitative strategies together under the single rubric of "opportunity
liberalism," Davies has obscured important differences in their respective links
between income and employment. The rehabilitative approach to poverty
policy may still be faithful to another common law analogy, but it has yet to
demonstrate its ability to construct and maintain a national liberal consensus.
-Allison Moore
21. See Perry, supra note 20, at 57 ("The heart of tort law, then, is a legal obligation to pay
compensation for harm caused, where the obligation is owed by the person who caused the harm directly
to the person who suffered it.").
22. See MORrON J. HORWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 33-34, 166
(1992); see also supra note 3.
23. See KEaTON Er AL., supra note 20, at 6 ("Arising out of the various and ever-increasing clashes
of the activities of persons living in a common society ... there must of necessity be losses ... sustained
as a result of the activities of others. The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses ......
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
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The System Worked: Our Schizophrenic Stance
on Welfare
Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics. By Steven M. Teles." Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1996. Pp. x, 226. $29.95.
The republic has welfare reform on its mind. On August 22, 1996,
President Clinton, faced with an impending election and the daunting prospect
of explaining a three-time veto in light of his past promises to remake
welfare,' signed into law a bill that, among other things, devolves greater
flexibility to the states and imposes sharp restrictions on the availability of
AFDC.2 Even the staunchest advocates of reform acknowledge that we have
entered an era of uncertainty.3 In such a climate, Steven Teles's study, Whose
Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics, enhances our collective understanding of
AFDC's history and continues the national conversation about society's
obligations to the poor.
Whose Welfare vividly describes the genesis of AFDC, the changes in the
composition of the program and its recipients, and the various attempts at
reform beginning in the 1960s. Eschewing the approach taken by consensus-
based scholarship,4 Teles insists that welfare politics represents a breakdown
of the democratic decisionmaking process. He claims that welfare policy has
not legitimately reflected popular sentiment over the last thirty years, and
argues that this state of affairs is best explained by a theory of "elite
* Olin-Bradley Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Government. Harvard Univcrsity
1. See F. Christopher Arterton, Campaign '92: Strategies and Tactics of the Candidates, in TIHE
ELECTION OF 1992, at 74, 99 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1993) (discussing Clinton/Gore ad that announced.
"Welfare Can Be a Second Chance, Not a Way of Lifc" and called for "an end to welfare as we know it").
2. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 104-94). For most mothers. AFDC
is a transitional program. See MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD. WELFARE REALnTIES 28 (1994). Less
than 15% of current beneficiaries will be on welfare for two years or less in a lifetime: 48% will return to
AFDC for periodic spells adding up to ten years or more. See id.
3. See, e.g., All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast. Aug. I. 1996). transcript available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Sen. Slade Gorton. who admitted that he was "not at all
certain of what the consequences of the passage of this bill will be"); Alison Mitchell. Two Chnton Aides
Resign to Protest New Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 12. 1996. at AI (reporting resignations of DHHS
Assistant Secretaries Peter Edelman and Mary Jo Bane over "deep concerns" about new law).
4. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER & ELLEN HOLLINGSWORTH. THE "DESERVING POOR": A STUDY OF
WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (1971); MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986): FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR (1971).
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dissensus."5 Unfortunately, the study falls short in two respects. First, contrary
to the author's claim, the political system has "worked ' 6 by producing policy
in tune with popular views. Notwithstanding the dramatic recent round of
devolution of authority, it is the public as a whole, and not merely the elites,
that remains deeply conflicted over welfare goals. Second, even if there were
a disjunction between public sentiment and policy, this is best understood as
characteristic of a healthy deliberative democracy.
Whose Welfare analyzes the actions of the cast of intellectuals who have
been charged, whether by electoral process or by chance, with the
responsibility of defining the contours of welfare policy. Teles's explanation
is top-down by nature: Politicians, activists, and judges have prevented AFDC
from evolving to reflect the prevailing views of the populace. As a first step,
he argues that whereas AFDC's precursor, Aid to Dependent Children,
originally was established in 1935 to supplement state programs designed to
keep destitute widows out of the labor force, today eighty-five percent of the
public supports requiring women with preschool children to work in order to
receive public assistance (p. 55). As Teles asserts, "[t]he set of beliefs that
formed the moral foundation for the mother's aid and Aid to Dependent
Children programs has utterly collapsed" (p. 57).
Having explained that requiring work is a critical element of any legitimate
form of welfare, Teles goes on to argue that reform has been frustrated by
"elite dissensus," a system malfunction marked by a failure on the part of the
political elite to "give form and structure to [the public's] preferences" (p.
165). He notes that, compared with the public at large, professional elites
possess "well-constrained ideological structures" (p. 62). The more actively
elites involve themselves in the social issues of the day, the more likely it is
that extreme bipolar debate will occur (p. 74). Teles finds that welfare is
particularly vulnerable to dissensus dynamics because the issue implicates
"regime level consequences ' 7 (p. 164), and because the poor have no direct
representation in the political process but are spoken for by competing
organizations (pp. 15, 16, 164). He avers that elite "disjunction" has
characterized welfare politics since the 1960s. His portrait is of an America
5. As Teles explains, dissensus is characterized by "large or intellectually powerful elites at the
extremes of the ideological spectrum who possess roughly equal power" and a resulting "insufficiency of
the political center" (pp. 76-77). Consensus politics, by contrast, is recognizable by an alignment of public
opinion and elite opinion that is "sufficiently strong, persistent, and mature to act as a counterweight against
interest-group agreements" (p. 11).
6. See LESLIE H. GELB & RICHARD K. BETrs, THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED (1979)
(arguing that political system "worked" with respect to American involvement in Vietnam in that even
when public opinion swung decisively against conflict, most Americans actually favored escalating efforts
to win war over outright withdrawal).
7. By "regime level" issues, Teles means those "basic issues of citizenship and social system
maintenance ... [that] concern[] not merely who gets what, when, where, and how, but why a particular
community exists and for what ends it is organized" (pp. 16-17).
930 [Vol. 106: 929
Book Note
where "welfare dependency continued to rise" (p. 80), even as attempts to tie
public assistance meaningfully to work requirements were foiled.
The author lays much of the blame squarely at the door of self-styled
advocates of the poor, such as the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO).8 Rather than lobbying for legislative reform or assisting the poor to
get off the rolls, the welfare movement sought to secure a guaranteed annual
income. NWRO was instrumental in the derailment of Nixon's Family
Assistance Plan (FAP), a proposal supported by politicians on both sides of the
aisle. Subsequent plans either failed or produced only cosmetic effects. 9
Political leaders, for their part, opted for the expedient practice of credit-
claiming and risk-avoidance instead of seeking national reform: Successive
administrations granted waivers for states to implement innovations (pp.
124-38). Finally, Teles argues that the Supreme Court's rulings, as well as the
intellectual ideas embodied in them,'0 exacerbated the climate of gridlock.
While Teles accurately points out that support of AFDC expenditures has
declined and values of work have changed over time, he is wrong to conclude
that the electorate no longer supports the program. That AFDC occasionally
has been amended suggests that the program has been susceptible to the ebb
and flow of public pressures. Indeed, the new law demonstrates that strict
limits can be enacted when national will is brought to bear on existing policy.
In other words, welfare policy has reflected, and continues to exemplify, the
rational contradictions of popular goals. The answer is that Americans feel that
a safety net is necessary, but have come to dislike the costliness" of the
program and the effects that such a safety net may have on those who rely on
it.12 The author is surely correct that support for "welfare" spending has
8. The contributions of the welfare rights movement should not be wholly overlooked. however, since
lawyers were instrumental in the creation of "'fair processes for eligibility determination and . ensurling)
horizontal equity." See BANE & ELLWOOD. supra note 2. at 12-14.
9. The Work Incentive Program (WIN) passed in 1967, requiring states to establish %%ork programs
with sanctions for noncompliance and creating a financial incentive to work. but WIN was never fully
implemented (p. 95). President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income was defeated in 1976 The
Family Assistance Plan passed in 1988, but the work provisions were widely seen as paper requirements
(pp. 94-95). See also id. at 20-21.
10. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Proper,, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich suggested that welfare
might be more accurately understood as a property right rather than as merely a pnvilege, and this idea was
adopted in the Court's analysis in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See mnfra text accompanying
notes 16-21.
11. Actually, although AFDC expenditures have increased over time and in 1993 reached S13 billion
(4.7 million families assisted), they comprise less than one percent of the annual federal budget See BANE
& ELLWOOD, supra note 2, at x.
12. Teles indulges the widespread misperception that fuels at least some of the public antipathy toward
AFDC: that welfare encourages individuals to have out-of-wedlock children (p. 173). In fact, as studies
repeatedly confirm, there are other dynamics in play; there are complex, real costs to raising children, and
AFDC's support is quite small relative to these costs. See. e.g.. GREGORY ACS. URBAN INs'rrrTrr. THE
IMPACT OF AFDC ON YOUNG WOMEN'S CHILDBEARING DECISIONS at i (1994) (observing that AFDC
generosity had "very modest" effect on first births and "virtually no effect on subsequent births"); BANE
& ELLWOOD, supra note 2, at I ll ("There is little observed impact of welfare on births out of wedlock.");
JANET CURRIE, WELFARE AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN 71-73 (1995) (reporting that studies have
concluded that "AFDC benefits have little effect on the probability of birth").
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consistently declined, yet he fails to mention that when the query is rephrased
as "assistance to the poor," sixty-four percent of those polled advocate more
spending, while only eleven percent favor decreased spending.'3 While
Americans see lack of effort, poor schools, and loose morals as causes of
poverty, a significant number also understand that there are not enough jobs
available (pp. 51-52). The overwhelming majority of Americans believes that
welfare alleviates hunger and helps people overcome hard times, but fears that
welfare encourages out-of-wedlock births and creates a disincentive to work
(pp. 49-50). These numbers, taken as a whole, indicate that the people are
profoundly divided over the goals of AFDC: Is it primarily intended to help
eligible mothers achieve self-sufficiency, or is it meant to provide a minimal
standard of living for poor children? Teles's analysis assumes that current
policy is out of step with public opinion based on a conception of AFDC as
furthering the former goal, while almost entirely ignoring the complicating
purpose of the latter.14 The populace seems to want to "have it both ways"
(p. 53)-it would like mothers to work but insists on maintaining an
appropriate standard of care for poor children. In short, any actual dissensus
exists with the public at large, and is not attributable solely to elites.
Even assuming that welfare policy has been out of step with the views of
the populace, however, Teles does not offer a compelling explanation as to
why this is so. The primary weakness of Teles's thesis is its failure to
distinguish between dissensus and consensus politics, and perhaps normal
politics, on conceptual and historical levels. Although the author provides clues
as to why the issue of welfare may be particularly divisive, he does not
demonstrate why the actions of elite actors here differ dramatically from the
vigorous political mobilizing and legal strategizing of daily politics. One
problem lies in his vague definition of dissensus. On the one hand, because of
the characteristics of elites, polarizing dynamics appear to be the norm when
they participate in robust public debate. This suggests that on most contentious
social issues, dissensus will occur. On the other hand, the author implies that
dissensus is an unusual phenomenon, producing "aberrant policy" (p. 8).
A further difficulty emerges in Teles's failure to provide detailed
examinations of welfare politics vis-A-vis other historical examples.' 5 Without
13. See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 1.
14. Today, one in five children is defined as poor, the proportion of poor children rose from 15% to
20% between 1974 and 1989. See IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPoRT 1 (1992). See generally
OLIVIA GOLDEN, POOR CHILDREN AND WELFARE REFORM (1992) (analyzing benefits of program); BOBBIE
G. TURNER, FEDERAL/STATE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM AND ITS BENEFIT TO BLACK
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 1935-1985 (1993) (discussing importance of AFDC for black children). Some
studies suggest that, compared with in-kind aid, AFDC produces no quantifiable direct benefits for children.
See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 92-117. Nonetheless, a case can be made for cash assistance based on the
argument that in-kind aid does not permit individuals sufficient autonomy to order their lives and those of
dependent children.
15. Teles mentions only the airline deregulation of the 1970s and the tax reform of the 1980s as
examples of consensus politics (p. 11). No historical examples of dissensus politics are explored.
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such analogies, it is unclear why elite behavior and the political dynamic in the
welfare context should be deemed dysfunctional. Teles's more specific
arguments demonstrate this point. One critical thread of his theory is that elites
within the legal profession are partly responsible for dissensus-that "[s]tarting
with King [v. Smith] and running through Goldberg [v. Kelly], the ordinary
legislative process was circumvented" (p. 144) (emphasis added). Yet while the
welfare cases were dramatic decisions in their own right, it is debatable
whether the Supreme Court departed from the norm in applying the law. The
author rather overstates the actual scope of these decisions and misunderstands
the nature of the judicial-political process.' 6 Contrary to Teles's claim (p.
116), the welfare cases do not resemble the abortion cases, in which, according
to some jurists and scholars, illegitimate judicial activism arrested and
polarized political deliberation. 17 Whereas the Court has pronounced with
unmistakable clarity a woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy
within the first trimester,'8 it has never "ratified" a right to welfare.' 9 In
Goldberg v. Kelly,20 the Court held that due process required only that
recipients be granted an evidentiary hearing before termination of their
benefits, but stopped far short of finding an unconditional right to the statutory
distribution of wealth.2' Teles does not clearly explain how judges should
have avoided contributing to dissensus while fairly deciding the critical legal
claims at stake; it is not sufficient to simply say that courts must avoid the
language of "entitlement." Nor is it apparent that lawyer/activists circumvented
the normal political process. Elites, as well as lay persons, have long sought
to vindicate their rights in the legal system. Litigation, moreover, often
comprises an integral component of normal political strategy.
16. More plausible is Teles's claim that the Court's decisions helped spur sticter welfare rules (pp.
115-16), as it is undisputed that the costs of maintaining welfare rose as a result of these rulings.
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992) (Scalia. J . concurrng in part.
dissenting in part) ("Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of
abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it, by elevaung it to the national level where it is
infinitely more difficult to resolve."); cf. Stephen L. Carter, Rush to a Lethal Judgment. N.Y. TIEs. July
21, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 28-29 (arguing that recent decisions by Ninth and Second Circuits threaten
to short-circuit deliberative process over divisive notion of assisted suicide).
18. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that woman has "fundamental- pnvacy right
to terminate her pregnancy in first trimester).
19. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). the Court struck down an Alabama regulation that denied
AFDC benefits to families in which a male cohabited with the mother of eligible children. See d. But as
Teles acknowledges (p. 108), the case was decided on statutory grounds and did not create a new
substantive constitutional right. See id. at 329-34. In Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). the Court
struck down Connecticut's one-year residency requirement for AFDC eligibility. Yet rather than finding
a constitutional right to public assistance, the Court grounded its decision in the right to travel freely and
equal protection of the laws. See id. at 629-33.
20. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21. Subsequent decisions further affirmed the notion that no fundamental right to welfare exists. See.
e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (upholding federal law requiring that children living in same
home be considered as part of same household): New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino. 413
U.S. 405 (1973) (upholding state work incentive law); Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(rejecting "substantive" challenges to state's monthly AFDC cap).
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If one remains convinced that AFDC has long been out of step with public
opinion, it is still possible to understand disjunction as illustrative of a properly
functioning system. As the historian Gordon Wood aptly noted, our peculiar
"balanced constitutional" political order was designed to "check the
imprudence of democracy." 22 The American political-legal structure does not
reflect every shift in popular approval; rather, it may, at times, prolong debate
or frustrate transient majorities in the interest of protecting not only deeply
entrenched values, 3 such as due process and perhaps the modem principle
of an activist national government, 24 but also policies across generations. Just
as the system "controlled the effects" of the welfare rights movement's
"passions, '25 so it checked the efforts of those who sought transformation of
either the policy of cash assistance or the underlying principle of limited social
welfare spending. However unpopular AFDC has been, it does not follow that
intense public scrutiny of the issue has occurred until recently, or that,
borrowing Bruce Ackerman's language, "broad and deep"26 support for
fundamental reform has ever existed during the last three decades. Hence, the
cycle of devolution represents an institutional slowdown that permits ad hoc
tinkering until informed deliberation takes place and a new consensus emerges
in favor of comprehensive reform.
Upon reflection, it is apparent that the new welfare structure, in its nascent
form, falls far short of Teles's vision of a national solution.27 Although it puts
teeth into existing work requirements, the law follows the pattern of devolution
of which Teles is sharply critical (pp. 119-46), and it remains to be seen
whether adequate training programs will emerge, or whether private institutions
will fill in the void on behalf of children whose mothers no longer qualify for
AFDC. In the end, although Whose Welfare posits an intriguing theory, its
parts do not coalesce as a persuasive whole. To be sure, the author makes a
number of incisive observations and provides often arresting accounts of the
welfare rights movement. Still, at a time when sober reflection on the past and
thoughtful solutions for the present are sorely needed, Whose Welfare speaks
in a softer voice than one would have hoped.
-Robert L. Tsai
22. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 554 (1969).
23. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10 (1991) (advocating dualist theory
of judicial review in which courts serve democracy by protecting erosion of "hard-won principles" by
.,political elites who have failed to gain broad and deep popular support for their innovations").
24. Public opinion is but the beginning of a process of refinement to "best discern the true interest"
of the citizens, to promote "justice," and to ensure that these considerations are not "sacrifice(d] to
temporary or partial considerations." THE FEDERAuST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed.,
1937).
25. See id. at 56-59; see also WOOD, supra note 22, at 575 ("'To regulate and not to eradicate [the
passions] ... is the province of policy."' (quoting John Adams)).
26. See ACKERMAN, supra note 23, at 10.
27. The author believes that support for a national solution exists. Accordingly, he advocates uprooting
AFDC and planting a national "insurance-like system of income security" (p. 170). His approach would
establish a "general civic entitlement," thereby "guaranteeing work to everyone" (p. 172).
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